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THE INFLUENCE OF RE-SELECTION ON 
INDEPENDENT DECISION MAKING IN 
STATE SUPREME COURTS 
HON. JUSTICE ANN A. SCOTT TIMMER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Soon after I was appointed to the Arizona Court of Appeals in 2000, I 
attended a two-week session for new appellate court judges at the National 
Judicial College in Reno, Nevada. Among the speakers was former Tennessee 
Supreme Court Justice Penny White, who spoke about the need to consider how 
language used in opinions is understood by the public. She related her experience 
of losing her retention election in 1996 in the wake of the Tennessee Supreme 
Court’s controversial decision reversing a death sentence. Justice White pointed 
out that some language used in the opinion—for example, stating that the murder 
of a grandmother wasn’t “cruel”—was misunderstood and prompted misplaced 
outrage. Justice White’s message was to be careful with word choices. My 
takeaway was that Justices could be fired for doing their jobs if the public is 
unhappy with a single opinion. Having just surrendered a lucrative law practice 
to take the bench, I found Justice White’s cautionary tale chilling. 
As the years progressed and I found myself deciding publicly controversial 
cases, the ghost of Justice White’s retention loss occasionally hovered in my 
peripheral vision, taking more definite shape at times—for example when three 
Iowa Supreme Court Justices lost their retention elections in 2010 following a 
divisive same-sex marriage decision. But whenever that menace reappeared, I 
consciously, and hopefully successfully, banished it by considering the 
importance of adhering to my oath of office, preserving my integrity, and 
reminding myself that the worst thing that could happen is that I would be voted 
out of office and forced to return to the practice of law with my head held high. 
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As organized campaigns against state Supreme Court1 Justices have increased 
in recent years,2 particularly with the proliferation of dark money contributions 
and social media, I have pondered the effect on sitting Justices. Ask people what 
they desire in a Justice and they most likely say something that suggests a fair and 
independent decision-maker. But do our judicial re-selection methods pressure 
Justices to consider their personal welfare when making decisions at the cost of 
independence? 
This article does not focus on reforming existing methods for re-selecting 
state Supreme Court Justices. Rather, I seek to add to our knowledge of how 
current re-selection systems affect sitting Justices. After a historical overview of 
how the states choose to select and retain Supreme Court Justices, I hypothesize 
that the re-selection methods—elections and reappointments—imposed on most 
Justices tempt them to act strategically to maximize their prospects of 
maintaining their positions. To test this hypothesis, I gathered evidence from 
confidential interviews conducted with sitting and retired state Supreme Court 
Justices and federal court judges who formerly served in state courts. To further 
test the hypothesis, I also propose as a sub-hypothesis that Justices concerned 
with re-selection act strategically in dissenting or specially concurring. To test this 
sub-hypothesis, I examine two empirical measures: (1) Justices’ overall dissent 
and special concurrence rates the year before a re-selection event as compared 
with the rate the year after; and (2) Justices’ criminal dissent and special 
concurrence rates the year before a re-selection event as compared with the rate 
the year following re-selection. 
II 
BALANCING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE WITH DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY: 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The Eighteenth Century American colonists so resented King George III’s 
exercise of power to appoint and remove judges that the Declaration of 
Independence lists as a grievance that the King “has made judges depend on his 
will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their 
salaries.”3 To protect judicial independence, the framers of the United States 
Constitution empowered the President to appoint federal judges, with Senate 
 
 1.  Texas and Oklahoma have two courts of last resort, one for civil appeals and one for criminal 
appeals. Other states have courts of appeals as courts of last resort. For ease of reference, I refer to each 
court of last resort as a “Supreme Court.” See Court of Last Resort, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Court_of_last_resort [https://perma.cc/FQK2-DRRW] (last visited Sept. 22, 
2018). 
 2.  See, e.g. JOANNA SHEPERD, JUSTICE AT RISK: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 6 (2013), https://www.acslaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/old-
uploads/originals/documents/JusticeAtRisk_Nov2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ARG-YDV4].  
 3.  Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge’s Perspective on Judicial 
Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1970 (1988) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776)).  
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approval, for lifetime tenures.4 Likewise, the majority of states provided lifetime 
appointments for judges, constrained only by the requirement of good behavior.5 
Judicial elections were rare during the country’s fledgling years.6 
In a wave of populist sentiment, states turned to electing judges in the first 
half of the 1800s, believing that elected judges would be more accountable to the 
public than appointed judges.7 Jacksonian populism fizzled, but more states 
turned to electing judges in the mid-1800s “based on the theory that ‘elected 
judges who derived their authority from the people would be more independent-
minded than hand-picked friends of governors or jurists subject to the beck and 
call of the legislature.’”8 These reforms were largely successful, and by the start 
of the Civil War, the majority of states elected their judges.9 
The pendulum swung away from electing judges in the first part of the 1900s 
with the advent of the “merit selection” system for selecting judges.10 Reformers 
had become concerned that electing judges did not result in seating legally 
competent jurists and gave political party bosses the power to hand pick 
successful judicial candidates, thereby threatening their independence.11 
In a typical merit selection system, an independent citizen commission 
recommends several candidates and, “[f]rom this pool, the Governor appoints a 
judge.”12 After a period of time, voters decide whether the judge should be 
retained in office.13 Thereafter, the judge runs for reelection at regular intervals 
in uncontested retention elections.14 Today, twenty-one states select Justices 
through partisan15 or non-partisan elections,16 although Justices may be 
 
 4.  Sandra Day O’Connor & RonNell Andersen Jones, Reflections on Arizona’s Judicial Selection 
Process, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 16 (2008). 
 5.  Grodin, supra note 3, at 1970. In the original thirteen states, either the legislature or the governor 
appointed the judges. Diane M. Johnsen, Building a Bench: A Close Look at State Appellate Courts 
Constructed by the Respective Methods of Judicial Selection, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 829, 836 (2016). 
 6.  O’Connor & Jones, supra note 4, at 16. 
 7.  Id. Georgia became the first state to use elections to select judges when it amended its 
constitution in 1812. Id.  
 8.  Id. at 16 17 (quoting Charles Gardner Geyh, An Overview of State Judicial Selection Systems and 
Their Relationship to Judicial Independence, in SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR PROJECT ON THE STATE OF 
THE JUDICIARY, BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 2007 CONFERENCE: THE DEBATE OVER JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS AND STATE COURT JUDICIAL SELECTION, 7 (Georgetown Law, 2007)).  
 9.  Id. at 17. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Johnsen, supra note 5, at 837. 
 15.  Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas. 
 16.  Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. New Mexico’s 
system is unique. After a Justice is elected in a partisan election, the Justice thereafter runs periodically 
in retention elections. 
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appointed to fill mid-term vacancies.17 The remaining twenty-nine states18 and the 
District of Columbia use a form of merit selection, gubernatorial appointment, 
or legislative appointment to initially select Justices for their Supreme Courts.19 
Only a handful of states provide lifetime or near-lifetime tenures for Justices, 
subject to good behavior requirements.20 Sitting Justices in the remaining states 
and the District of Columbia must be reappointed or run in retention, partisan, 
or non-partisan elections.21 
The variety of systems currently used by the states reflects a lack of consensus 
about the best way to choose Supreme Court Justices. The debate generally 
focuses on how to preserve judicial independence while holding Justices 
democratically accountable.22 
III 
THE MODERN REALITY:  TURNING UP THE PRESSURE ON SITTING JUSTICES 
A consistent goal of all judicial selection and re-selection systems is a desire 
to select and retain judges who independently exercise judgment to interpret and 
apply the law and yet remain accountable for their performances.23 Since the 
1980s, however, these systems have become increasingly politicized as special 
interest groups grasped that “investing in judicial races—often by funding ads 
urging voters to hold judges accountable for rulings in controversial cases—is an 
inexpensive way to shape policy: cheaper than lobbying, cheaper than supporting 
the campaigns of governors and state legislators.”24 
 
 17. See BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 2. 
 18.  Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and 
Wyoming.  
 19.  See BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 2. 
 20.  Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island provide lifetime tenure or tenure until a 
specific age. In New Jersey, the Governor can confer lifetime tenure after the Justice has served seven 
years after appointment. See BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 2. 
 21.  See BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 2. For ease of reference, I collectively refer to reappointment, 
retention elections, and partisan and non-partisan re-elections as “re-selection” or “re-selection events.” 
Unless otherwise noted, I also include the District of Columbia within the meaning of “state” or “states.”  
 22.  ADAM BONICA AND MICHAEL J. WOODRUFF, STATE SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY AND 
“NEW STYLE” JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 1 (2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2169664 
[https://perma.cc/GC7K-NB6T] or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2169664 [https://perma.cc/HF5B-
MXNJ]. 
 23.  See JOHN F. KOWAL, NEW IDEAS FOR A NEW DEMOCRACY: JUDICIAL SELECTION FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 4 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Judicial_ 
Selection_21st_Century.pdf [https://perma.cc/22W4-FHCS] (“But they were all intended to ensure an 
appropriate balance of independence and accountability.”); Anthony J. Delligatti, A Horse of a Different 
Color: Distinguishing the Judiciary from the Political Branches in Campaign Financing, 115 W. VA. L. 
REV. 401, 414 (2012) (noting that arguments supporting the various methods of judicial selection used 
throughout different time periods have been public accountability, free speech, and judicial 
independence).  
 24.  KOWAL, supra note 23, at 1. 
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Money has progressively poured into judicial elections. A series of United 
States Supreme Court decisions, starting with Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, have permitted dark money25 to fund attack ads on sitting Justices 
and reined in efforts to protect publicly financed candidates from being 
outspent.26 “From 2000–2009, state supreme court candidates raised $206.9 
million, more than doubling the $83.3 million raised in the prior decade.”27 In 
2013–14 alone, spending in nineteen state Supreme Court elections exceeded 
$34.5 million.28 Retention elections, once considered non-political, have become 
battlegrounds in some states for special interest groups and partisan politics. As 
noted by Scott Greytak from Justice at Stake, increased spending in retention 
elections “puts new pressures on judges who had previously been largely 
insulated from politicized judicial elections.”29 
In highly publicized accounts, Justices have been unseated for making 
unpopular decisions. In 1986, three California Supreme Court Justices, including 
Chief Justice Rose Bird, lost their retention elections in the face of a campaign 
primarily organized around their opposition to the death penalty and the 
California Governor’s criticism of Chief Justice Bird as anti-business.30 Ten years 
later, Justice Penny White lost her retention election in Tennessee because the 
Tennessee Supreme Court unanimously upheld a murder conviction but 
overturned the death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.31 In 
a 2004 partisan election, Justice Warren McGraw lost his bid to remain on the 
West Virginia Supreme Court after a large coal company CEO launched a $3 
million campaign to defeat McGraw because of past votes favoring plaintiffs.32 
McGraw’s defeat was partially due to an unpopular vote he cast in a criminal 
case.33 And in 2010, three Iowa Supreme Court Justices lost their retention 
elections following a successful campaign against them funded by those opposed 
to the Court’s unanimous 2009 ruling in favor of same-sex marriage equality.34 
These examples represent a miniscule percentage of re-selection events held 
over the same time period and can be overlooked as aberrant. But have they 
planted seeds of concern in Justices’ minds that sprout when potentially 
 
 25.  Dark money is often described as campaign contributions provided by “people who want to 
influence elections without identifying themselves.”  Danny Emmer, Shedding Light on “Dark Money”: 
The Heightened Risk of Foreign Influence Post-Citizens United, 20 SW. J. INT’L L. 381, 394 (2014). 
 26.  KOWAL, supra note 23, at 4. 
 27.   Id. at 9. 
 28.  SCOTT GREYTAK ET AL., BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2013 14, at 2 (Laurie Kinney ed., 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/publications/The_New_Politics_of_Judicial_Election_2013_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N2GM-SD5N]. 
 29.  Id. at 4. 
 30.  KOWAL, supra note 23, at 10. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection Reconsidered: A Plea for Radical Moderation, 35 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 623, 631 32 (2012). 
 33.  Id. at 631. 
 34.  KOWAL, supra note 23, at 12. 
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unpopular decisions loom? After Justice White’s defeat, Tennessee Governor 
Don Sundquist suggested it should, commenting: “Should a judge look over his 
shoulder to the next election in determining how to rule on a case? I hope so. I 
hope so.”35 
In the wake of losing his retention election in 1986, former California 
Supreme Court Associate Justice Joseph R. Grodin wrote that the election 
rhetoric, which criticized the Justices’ votes on death penalty cases, sent a 
message to judges that if they want to keep their jobs, they should decide cases 
according to popular view.36 Grodin cautioned as follows: 
The risk that judges will receive and act upon that message, unconsciously if not 
consciously, is substantial. Justice Otto Kaus, my former colleague on the California 
Supreme Court, has candidly stated in public that he cannot be sure whether his vote 
on an important case in 1982 may have been influenced subconsciously by his awareness 
that the outcome could affect his chances in the retention election being conducted that 
year. I would have to say that the same is true of my votes in critical cases during 1986; 
I just can’t be sure.37 
In short, pressure on state Supreme Court Justices has ratcheted up in recent 
years. Scholarship, largely focused on the United States Supreme Court, has 
suggested that Justices are strategic actors who are influenced in their decisions 
by internal and external factors.38 States must confront whether their methods for 
re-selecting Supreme Court Justices, with the associated threat of being unseated 
for making unpopular decisions, serve as external influences on the Justices’ 
independence in decision making. 
IV 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
My hypothesis is: the re-selection methods—elections and reappointments—
imposed on most state Supreme Court Justices tempt them to act strategically to 
maximize their prospects of maintaining their positions. 
A.  The Interviews 
To examine whether and to what extent re-selection events affect sitting state 
Supreme Court Justices in decision-making, I turned to the source: sitting 
Justices. As one myself, I hoped I would enjoy sufficient credibility that Justices 
would feel comfortable having candid discussions. Overwhelmingly, that 
appeared to be the case. Still, as scholars have warned, although stories are a 
valuable insight into how people think about a topic, they might not tell us how 
 
 35.  Id. at 10. 
 36.  Grodin, supra note 3, at 1980. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  As explained by Epstein and Knight: “[J]ustices may be primarily seekers of legal policy, but 
they are not unconstrained actors who make decisions based only on their own ideological attitudes. 
Rather, Justices are strategic actors who realize that their ability to achieve their goals depends on a 
consideration of the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the 
institutional context in which they act.” LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 
10 (1998). 
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those people act.39 Caution is also warranted as the interviewer—me—is a peer 
of the Justices interviewed and is therefore inherently biased. Thus, despite my 
best efforts to be objective, my observations may be colored by my own views. 
1.  Methodology 
There are 351 state Supreme Court Justices.40 I sought to interview at least 
ten percent culled from diverse re-selection systems, different areas of the United 
States, and from states with both large and small populations. I interviewed 
thirty-seven sitting Justices (10.5% of currently serving Justices) and seven 
former Justices, one of whom was also retired from a federal court bench, from 
twenty-five states. Twenty Justices are from states with partisan or non-partisan 
elections, eighteen are from states with retention elections or retention by a 
government authority, and two are from states with no re-selection processes. To 
gain a slightly different perspective, I also interviewed four sitting federal judges 
who formerly served as state court judges or Justices.41 
I identified who to contact for an interview in a few ways. I initially contacted 
and interviewed Justices I know. During some of those interviews, Justices 
volunteered to contact others on my behalf. I also emailed Justices randomly 
asking for interviews. One Justice contacted me after hearing I had interviewed 
his colleague. My initial contact with all of the Justices was through an email 
explaining my research topic, asking for an interview, and promising 
confidentiality. I contacted seventy-two Justices/federal judges and interviewed 
forty-four, meaning 61% agreed to an interview. Two others expressed interest 
in being interviewed, but we were unable to schedule a convenient time; another 
Justice sent me an email explaining her views on my topic. The rest either politely 
declined or did not respond. 
Most interviews were telephonic but a few took place in person. After 
reiterating my thesis topic and the confidential nature of any comments, I asked 
the same questions of all Justices, with slight alterations due to differences in re-
selection systems. I also posed somewhat different questions to the federal 
judges. And sometimes the answers prompted follow-up questions. The 
interviews ranged from twenty to ninety minutes, with most lasting around thirty 
minutes. I did not record the interviews but simultaneously took notes, meaning 
some of my quotes might be imperfect but not substantively so. 
Nearly all the Justices and judges were comfortable and forthcoming, more 
so as the interviews progressed. A significant number expressed relief when I 
 
 39.  TRACEY E. GEORGE, MITU GULATI, & ANN C. MCGINLEY, THE NEW OLD LEGAL REALISM 
18 (2011) (Scholarly Works Paper), http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/173 [https://perma.cc/KS7Y-
FKL2] (published with changes as Tracey E. George, Mitu Gulati, & Ann C. McGinley, The New Old 
Legal Realism 105 NW. U. L. REV. 689 (2011).  
 40.  District of Columbia Court of Appeals, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/District_of_ 
Columbia_Court_of_Appeals [https://perma.cc/Z4EQ-CFMV] (last visited September 22, 2018); State 
Supreme Courts, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_supreme_courts [https://perma.cc/QE4U-
T2JJ] (last visited Sept. 22, 2018). 
 41.  I obtained IRB approval for all interviews. 
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emphasized that I would not identify them by name or court or report any facts 
that would identify their courts.42 They put their trust in my promise, to my great 
appreciation, which likely increased their candor. The Justices based their 
opinions on both their own experiences and on conversations with colleagues and 
peers in other states. As I report below, some common themes emerged. 
2.  Common Themes 
Although each Justice expressed his own opinion about the influence of re-
selection events on deciding cases, some common themes emerged. 
a.  Re-selection pressures exist but don’t typically affect how Justices vote 
in cases. All justices were initially asked whether the prospect of a Justice losing 
a re-selection bid impacts decision making. Most Justices said no but recognized 
that Justices facing re-selection naturally worry about being unseated. As one 
Justice observed, the influence of elections on state Supreme Court Justices is 
“subtle” as “no one is going to say, ‘if I rule one way I won’t be reelected.’ But in 
private conversations, judges will express concern about being reelected.” 
Another Justice in a retention state said that “Justices feel safe until shortly 
before the retention . . . [t]hen anxiety sets in and you start to worry about a 
number of things including retention.” Indeed, almost all Justices in their last 
terms and retired Justices reported feeling worry-free after their last re-selection 
event (“I heaved a sigh of relief;” “It takes the load off when deciding high-profile 
cases”). But does this anxiety affect votes? “I’ve never seen it,” said one Justice, 
summing up the majority view. 
Several Justices accepted that re-selection pressures are simply part of the job 
and must therefore be taken in stride. As one put it, “[p]olitics are so nasty, dirty, 
awful, that if someone wants to find a decision to use against you in an election, 
they will. So don’t worry about it.” A Justice in a partisan-election state 
acknowledged that he thinks about how a decision will impact his constituents 
but has not voted on a case to further his constituents’ interests. This sentiment 
was echoed by a Justice in a retention-election state: “We’ve had two contentious 
retention elections here [centered on the Justices’ ideology]. It hasn’t changed 
our thinking about decisions, but it has caused concerns about the future.” 
Some Justices gave examples of the types of pressures brought to bear. One 
Justice in a retention-election state related that after his Court decided a case 
against the Governor who had appointed him and another colleague, the 
Governor’s office contacted them to convey disappointment with the decision. 
The Justice “thought this was highly inappropriate.” Another Justice recalled 
that concerns about re-selection entered his mind when legislators on one side of 
a case came as a group to sit in the front row of oral argument and stare at the 
 
 42.  For ease of reading, and to protect confidentiality, I use masculine pronouns when referring to 
the Justices regardless of their gender. And unless otherwise noted, I include the federal judges in the 
term “Justices.” 
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Court, although he was more concerned with how the outcome would affect court 
funding. 
A minority of Justices admitted that the prospect of being re-selected affects 
votes in cases. One Justice explained: 
I have been surprised by that revelation. I have been surprised by some of the language 
used by my colleagues when discussing how the outcome of the decision would impact 
elections and how that’s part of their consideration in making decisions. I researched 
the issue independently because I wondered about it and was and am concerned. 
A Justice in another partisan-election state who does not plan to seek re-
election elaborated: 
I think it’s always in the Justice’s mind. You can’t take politics out of anything whether 
you get to the court through election or appointment, and it depends on the politics of 
the state and how Justices are selected. . . . I’m mindful of the groups of people who 
supported me and the people who are in my district. I feel I’m as pure as anyone because 
I was supported by everyone with no opposition. But still, I am mindful of politics. I 
want to know how the decision is going to make the court and judiciary as a whole look; 
how does the decision square with my philosophy and what I ran on? I’m a Republican 
and I can issue the most liberal decisions and have no consequence. But I won’t. If 
someone says politics don’t enter into it, they’re lying. 
One Justice didn’t hesitate to say, “you bet” re-selection makes a difference 
and “[a]lmost everyone is in denial about it.” 
No Justice said he had ever voted on a case in a way to appease the public. 
But even among the Justices who had never seen others do so, many believed it 
has happened. One Justice’s answer to the question of whether re-selection 
events affect decision making typified others: 
I think it can and it has and it will. It doesn’t impact as often as people think. I see a lot 
of judicial independence and courage on the part of Justices here. There’s been a few 
times, less than five times, I stopped and thought “this is going to come back and haunt 
me,” but it didn’t change my decision. 
Another Justice remarked that re-selection concerns “shouldn’t” impact 
decision making, “[b]ut human nature being what it is, it probably flits though 
Justices’ minds, particularly in big cases and in ones with publicity. But for 
Justices trying to be neutral and impartial, it’s recognized but shouldn’t impact 
decision making.” 
Some Justices said the impact of re-selection pressures depends on a state’s 
re-selection method. One Justice in a retention-election state remarked: 
Based on my discussions with other Justices from other states, I think [partisan and non-
partisan] elections can definitely shape their decisions. In Michigan, Illinois, and 
Wisconsin, opposition groups will use Justices’ opinions to go after them. This is much 
less likely in a retention election unless there is a high profile controversial case like 
same-sex marriage out there. 
The Justices sitting in states with no re-selection methods took a “grass is 
always browner” view of the pressures put on Justices in other states. As one 
answered when asked whether the decision-making process for Justices on his 
court would be different if they had to stand for retention or re-election: 
I don’t see how it could be otherwise, I really don’t. That’s the problem with elections. 
There is an inherent coercive effect; you’re always looking over your shoulder wanting 
to get elected or re-elected. It you write opinions that the public doesn’t agree with, it 
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affects you. We’ve had to write controversial decisions, and if I had to worry about re-
election, it would have been awful. If I had to worry about being vilified by an opposing 
party, it would have been awful. It’s freeing being able to decide these matters without 
the personal worry. 
A few Justices related that concerns about re-selection have impacted votes 
on whether to grant discretionary review in a case. One explained: 
I don’t think it [re-selection concerns] impact our actual decisions because we rise above 
it. But are we concerned about that when deciding whether to grant review? Maybe. I 
can’t say we don’t consider it. If it’s something controversial like same-sex marriage, we 
might want to deny review or decide [the case] on a procedural issue to avoid deciding 
the merits. We try to avoid the issue sometimes. 
Another Justice said he has “heard people say, ‘why grant review when all 
this is going to do is anger the legislature or people?’ It’s made me mildly 
uncomfortable that this was a consideration.” 
The federal judges likewise expressed concern about the impact of re-
selection events. When asked whether he felt less constrained in making decisions 
now compared to when he served in the state court system, one federal district 
court judge responded: “Absolutely. I get a whole lot more press now, so 
everything I do is subject to much more coverage. But I recall when I transferred 
over here, I remember feeling relieved. And I didn’t even realize I had felt 
constrained. But I did.” He related that he could not have handled a contentious 
case involving a popular politician the same way had he been a state court judge. 
“A state court judge would have been run from office, probably, with [the 
politician’s] supporters and war chest. I got calls from people saying, ‘just wait for 
the election,’ not realizing they couldn’t affect me.” All the other federal judges 
echoed this expression of relief from worry over re-selection. As one said, in 
making decisions now, “[t]here isn’t in the background the possibility of losing 
your job.” 
b.  Justices combat pressures attendant to controversial cases by tapping 
a deep-seeded drive to “do the right thing.” The question I posed that prompted 
the most thoughtful answers was whether the Justices considered how the 
outcome of a controversial case might affect their chances for re-selection and, if 
so, how they dealt with it. 
Most Justices said they were acutely aware of the controversial nature of 
pending decisions. “It has to be a consideration; it has to enter your mind. I am 
aware of media and social media,” said one Justice, echoing others’ comments. 
Another noted, “I’m not oblivious to it. One can’t close their mind to knowing 
that a decision will help or hurt in the re-election effort.” 
But others did report being oblivious to controversy. “Ninety-nine percent of 
the time, I never thought what I was doing was controversial,” said one Justice, 
“so I can’t take credit for being brave as I thought I was being logical.” Another 
Justice sheepishly chalked up his obliviousness to egotism: “I was fairly arrogant 
in that respect. I assumed that my decisions would be met with general 
approbation.” And one Justice expressed surprise about the public’s negative 
reaction to his Court’s decision in a social-issue case: “I don’t remember 
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consciously thing about it. It floated through my mind that people would be 
unhappy. I followed the law, the [issue] was clear cut, and we never talked about 
it being a problem for the [election].” 
Many Justices remarked they never considered how an unpopular vote might 
affect them, but others recognized the threat and disregarded it or embraced it. 
One Justice said, “You do think about it, but there is nothing wrong with that. It 
makes you more scholarly [in your decisions].” To deal with perceived public 
pressure, these Justices spoke sincerely, and often passionately, about their 
desires to preserve the independence of the judiciary by ignoring personal 
concerns. No one thought their actions extraordinary, just necessary for the 
greater good. These comments by various Justices are emblematic: 
I was stubborn and wouldn’t cave into public pressure. I knew I could make a living as 
a trial attorney. Being idealistic in the sense of wanting to do the right thing isn’t being 
brave. It’s not the same thing as being in Nazi Germany and facing being shot for not 
following the regime’s view; I’m not sure I could do that. In the end, my refusal to yield 
to public pressure is a combination of wanting to do the right thing and being rebellious. 
. . . . 
It’s inconsistent with my job to be guided by [re-selection pressures]. I believe that being 
independent is the most important thing to being a judge. If I wasn’t, I feel I would let 
all judges down. 
. . . . 
I deal with it with courage. I push it out of my mind. In part, too, because all judges have 
faced it. We get strength from each other. 
. . . . 
I just remember my oath to steer clear of any influence. I do what I need to do and think 
that even if I write something benign, someone can use that against me in the current 
media market. Detractors can pull one quote or holding out of context and use it against 
me. The majority of people voting won’t read my opinions. It’s the lawyers and the 
judges below. I just try to be out there and let people know me and don’t worry about 
what’s said. 
. . . . 
My grandma used to say you can’t keep birds from flying overhead but you can keep 
them from nesting in your hair. 
Many Justices also said they accepted that they could lose their jobs for 
making an unpopular decision but reassured themselves with the knowledge that 
they could make a living elsewhere. One Justice shared his pragmatic view: 
How do I deal with the knowledge that I’m up for retention next year? I think, “what’s 
the worst that can happen?” I had a good run and I’ll go back to practice. And I can 
look myself in the mirror. Not even a close call. I would rather go down being true to 
myself and my profession than stay here and manufacture a position for fear of being 
thrown out. 
Justices also described what it was like to be challenged in re-selection events 
and how those experiences affected them. One Justice recalled a challenge early 
in his judicial career: 
[A colleague] wrote [a controversial social issue] decision and I joined. The Republican 
Party came after us both. I raised money just from family and friends. Very tough. When 
I signed off on the case, I didn’t consider the consequences. I had to travel all over the 
state and interview with newspapers. So many people stepped up because they wanted 
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to preserve judicial independence. It was a distraction from my duties, but it was nice to 
meet people and it was good to preserve the system. I wouldn’t want to do it again, 
though! I was [easily retained]. In the next election, I did nothing to campaign and was 
retained with no problem. 
Another recounted being targeted by an outside group during his re-selection 
bid: 
A group went after me . . . based on a dissent in a case concerning . . . [a law about 
monitoring] sex offenders. I had written . . . that the new law was [unconstitutional]. The 
group ran attack ads that played constantly, showing children on a playground and 
saying ‘Justice [X] sides with child molesters.’ It was funded by dark money. The ad was 
so over the top that people were outraged. I was interviewed by the media about it a 
half-dozen times. I won by the largest margin I had ever had. . . . Despite this experience, 
I don’t do things differently. I thought before my first election that you just have to be 
an independent decision maker. If you’re doing your job, there’s something there for 
everyone to hate you, so you can’t worry about it. . . . One of the unfortunate impacts 
from that election is that a lot of people have told me that they have thought of running 
for the Court or other courts, but they changed their minds after watching what I went 
through. 
Some Justices discussed the impact of prior challenges to their colleagues’ re-
selection bids. Most of these Justices recognized that the prior challenges were 
aberrant events that were not predictive, and if anything, these events, although 
worrisome, caused these Justices to double down on their resolve to block out 
any considerations of personal imperilment when deciding controversial cases. 
c.  Re-selection does not generally affect how decisions are written. When 
asked whether re-selection events impact how opinions are written, about fifty 
percent of Justices with views on the issue answered no.43 One Justice’s response 
typified others: “It’s not judicial elections. Is public perception influencing 
opinions? Yes. We’re careful to explain and reduce unnecessary flourishes. No 
need to use colorful language to provoke. That’s why you find more colorful 
language in dissents.” Others echoed this sentiment, emphasizing that they 
endeavor to avoid offending parties or lower courts and organize high-interest 
opinions so lay people can readily understand them. 
The other half of Justices thought that re-selection affects opinion drafting. 
Most in this group spoke about clarity and tone. As one thoughtful Justice 
explained: 
I think we alter the writing by softening the language to make it more clearly understood 
and palatable to the public and our constituents. But there is nothing wrong with that. I 
want to leave a good legacy, and I want the Court to look great. I will do an additional 
concurrence to provide more rationale in a softer way when I think the public or media 
might misunderstand the reasons for the majority. Often, my concurrence might be 
picked up by the press. Why did I do that? Maybe to make people think I really care 
about it. I wouldn’t do any differently if I was a Federal judge. We need to make sure 
that the public has faith in the judiciary. 
Some in this group also spoke to the need to handle high public interest cases 
with care. “With hot button cases, I want to acknowledge the [legitimacy of] the 
 
 43.  Four Justices were unsure whether re-selection impacts opinion writing, and two Justices 
expressed no opinion. 
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other side,” explained one Justice. So, for example, in overturning a death 
sentence, he is more likely to appease victims by saying something like, “the 
Court does not take this action lightly.” One Justice candidly acknowledged that 
some decisions issued from his Court are written in a way to maximize a Justice’s 
chances for re-selection: 
Some of what is written is written with the next election in mind, particularly in death 
penalty cases. One member [of my Court] is always intent on writing on death penalty 
cases as more of a political statement. . . . As the election year draws near, his writing 
becomes more rabid. 
He added that “sometimes we can take an issue and something can be written 
more broadly and should be, but instead it’s very, very narrowly tailored to be 
confined to just one case” for fear of public reaction. 
Language in dissents is sometimes included solely to appease Justices’ 
supporters. These Justices “‘wave the bloody flag,’ meaning they play to their 
group,” said one Justice of a few colleagues, “for example decrying that the 
majority has made a threat to democracy. It’s playing to your base. Whether done 
consciously for the election, I’m not sure. It’s just saying to the base, ‘we’re still 
on your side.’” Another Justice also noted that Justices will occasionally insert 
“disclaimers” about whether a result reflects a good or bad policy, especially 
when upholding legislation. 
Surprisingly, more than one Justice said that re-selection concerns can muddy 
opinion drafting. One observed that “if the majority wishes to yield to the public 
view, the decision is typically poorly written and conclusory. It avoids directly 
taking on precedent that challenges the decision’s outcome. It just declares the 
result.” A scholarly Justice who had clearly thought about the issue pointed to 
Professor and former Arkansas Supreme Court Justice Robert A. Leflar’s article, 
“Honest Judicial Opinions,”44 as evidence that Justices may mask their decisions 
with vague language. The interviewed Justice thought this masking may possibly 
be in reaction to re-selection concerns. One Justice expressed more outrage: 
It’s a reality that politics play a role in the judiciary when Justices are elected. . . . I’ve 
been amazed at some of the antics in drafting and crafting the opinion to support [a 
politically popular result]. It goes on during the election seasons and in high profile cases 
like when the governor sues the legislature for X power. 
One Justice thought that the judicial evaluation process in his state, which 
goes hand-in-hand with re-selection, along with the desire to be good jurists, 
compels Justices to craft better decisions. “We always understand we’ll be 
evaluated on the quality of the reasoning [and] writing” in a decision, and “we do 
take that seriously . . . The desire to be a good judge is reinforced by the 
evaluation system.” 
d.  Re-Selection does not generally tempt Justices to recuse from 
controversial cases. I asked whether the Justices ever suspected that a colleague 
had recused from a controversial case to avoid deciding it before an election. 
 
 44.  Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721, 741 (1979). 
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Overwhelmingly, the answer was no. But seven Justices answered yes. In one 
instance, a Justice was suspicious because, “the decision wouldn’t have gone over 
well in the recusing Justice’s district.” Another Justice was more than suspicious 
when a colleague running in a hotly contested partisan re-election bid recused in 
many cases and sometimes announced ridiculous reasons for doing so. 
Of note, one Justice remarked that “the greater infraction is not recusing 
when you should,” stating his belief that some Justices on his Court should have 
recused from a case when seeking re-selection to avoid the perception of 
impropriety. 
Interestingly, some Justices reported that recusal is much more of an issue 
with judges on lower courts. As one put it, “[r]ecusals are disfavored at the 
Supreme Court because it has to be explained,” but “I have seen it at the trial 
level on occasion.” Three Justices said that some of those judges have reportedly 
recused to avoid deciding controversial cases when they were seeking 
appointment to either the intermediate courts of appeal or the Supreme Court. 
One Justice said that while he was on an intermediate appellate court, “I saw 
people constantly getting off high profile cases” and noted that this was “a pattern 
with people applying for this Court.” Another Justice, who had once served on 
an intermediate appellate court, volunteered that successive chief judges knew 
when people were up for re-selection and purposefully avoided assigning 
controversial cases to those judges’ panels. 
e.  Justices do not generally avoid authoring dissents to strategically 
protect against being singled out for possible electoral sanction. In the mid-1980s, 
Melinda Gann Hall argued that the low dissent rate in state Supreme Courts 
could be explained, in part, by Justices using a strategy of not dissenting in cases 
of high public visibility to avoid being singled out for “possible electoral 
sanction.”45 She theorized as follows: 
For judges, controversial decisions become more difficult to justify on the basis of law 
when they depart from the majority’s decisions and vote in the minority. It can be 
argued that though voters may accept a legal explanation for a unanimous court’s 
unpopular decision, the mechanism of judicial accountability is more rigidly adhered to 
on issues where voters have information and strong preferences and where judges have 
singled themselves out for criticism. 
Therefore it can be hypothesized that justices who strongly desire re-election and fear 
the possibility of electoral sanction will not distinguish themselves from the rest of the 
court by dissenting on highly salient political questions. Instead, a justice will either vote 
with the majority or will mask his or her disagreement in a concurrence rather than a 
dissent. In other words, we should see a higher level of unanimous voting relative to an 
overall pattern on controversial, very visible issues for certain types of justices.46 
To test her theory, Hall conducted in-depth, confidential interviews with each 
Justice sitting on the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1983. Justice “A” told Hall that 
although he “professed a personal abhorrence of executions and the death 
 
 45.  Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case 
Study, 49 THE J. POL. 1117 (1987). 
 46.  Id. at 1119. 
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penalty,” because his constituents supported capital punishment and would 
retaliate against him at the polls for taking a contrary view, he did not dissent in 
cases affirming a defendant’s death sentence.47 Indeed, although Justice “A” filed 
dissents in favor of criminal defendants’ claims in 26.0% of non-capital cases 
decided in a single term, he dissented in favor of criminal defendants’ claims in 
only 3.3% of capital cases decided that term.48 
I related Hall’s findings to the Justices I interviewed and asked whether they 
had seen evidence that Justices avoided being singled out in controversial 
dissents to maximize job security. The majority answered no. A few took issue 
with application today of Hall’s theory. As one Justice said: “With controversial 
cases, if we have sharply different views, we’re more likely to write separately.” 
Another Justice expressed a similar sentiment: “I’ve stuck my neck out and so 
have my colleagues. We try to find consensus where we can on high profile cases 
but we have no qualms about dissenting. But we try to bring folks on board.” Still 
another said: “I wrote a dissent in a case concerning the Governor’s desire to put 
something on the ballot . . . The majority allowed it, but I was the lone dissenter. 
I didn’t care about going against the grain.” 
Some Justices discussed other reasons for not dissenting even when a Justice 
disagrees with the majority opinion. “In writing a dissent, a Justice has to pick his 
battles. I don’t see people doing that for political reasons,” said one Justice, while 
another pointed out that “[t]here is no point in dissenting when doing so wouldn’t 
make a difference.” Another Justice addressed the costs of dissenting: 
Stronger forces militate low dissent rates. Primarily, the culture of the court. Internally, 
we are collegial and get along. Being a frequent dissenter carries other costs. It identifies 
you as someone not effective at getting others to agree with you. Dissention is a 
concession of defeat. We’re always faced with the quandary of trying to join the majority 
and trying to make it better or exiting and dissenting. 
Conversely, a Justice explained an incentive to try and reach consensus: “Part 
of the calculus is wanting to be part of the majority to temper it.” And another 
noted that when the opinion is taking a view contrary to public consensus, “[w]e 
try to be as strong as possible to present a united front.” 
One Justice had a unique, and disturbing, explanation for what dissuades 
some Justices from dissenting: 
A bigger problem is that there are some Justices who are perceived as persuasive among 
the public and the legislature. They have pull. So, it’s more convenient and expected to 
side with whatever the position is taken by those Justices even if justice says otherwise. 
And if you’re up [for re-election] soon and need help from those Justices, you’re likely 
under pressure to agree. The reason is that this Justice can help with grassroots support 
and getting legislative support. Statewide elections are expensive. If Justices have that 
kind of pull, the inclination is to vote with them even when the Justice’s personal 
inclination is otherwise. 
Another Justice mentioned that his dissent rate was used against him in his 
re-election bid. “When I was attacked in the election, [my opponent] said I was 
 
 47.  Id. at 1120. 
 48.  Id. at 1122. 
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an outlier and he counted the dissents and tried to use it against me. He also tried 
to use it to show I wasn’t liked by the Court.” 
Several Justices reported evidence supporting Hall’s theory. Most of these 
Justices reported conversations had with Justices from other Courts. One Justice 
said: 
I’ve attended national events. In private discussion with other judges, some who are 
elected are very concerned about voter reaction. I remember one judge saying that if a 
dissent wouldn’t matter, why bother dissenting if it would only impact re-election 
chances. That makes me glad that [my state] doesn’t have partisan elections. 
Another Justice had a similar experience, observing that “[c]ourt culture 
varies. A judge from another state once candidly told me that he had to decide a 
case a certain way because he had an election coming up. I was shocked.” 
Some Justices reported first-hand experiences that supported Hall’s theory. 
One Justice complained that the electoral process “incentivizes Justices to refrain 
from expressing an unpopular opinion.” He resists this temptation: 
I try to write dissents/concurrences all the time if warranted. I do know that some 
colleagues feel differently because they don’t want to highlight that the majority thinks 
their position defective. I don’t feel that way. If people want to judge me, I want them 
to judge me on what I decide. I’m not enthusiastic about consensus. I won’t dissent just 
to embarrass someone, but I will if I feel strongly on an issue. 
f.  Courts rarely delay the release of opinions preceding an election. Most 
Justices reported that they had not seen a controversial opinion’s release delayed 
in the weeks before an election. But several Justices recalled instances when this 
occurred. Some Courts openly discussed the practice. “I don’t remember which 
[case, but] I remember discussions about the appropriateness of releasing an 
opinion before an election,” remarked one Justice. Another Justice stated that 
“I’ve seen people hold them and, at least twice, the Justices were candid in saying 
that the case is controversial, and the Justice is going to hold it until after the 
election.” This practice is justified, explained a Justice, to “avoid releasing cases 
that would cast a Justice up for retention in a bad light.” Another Court discussed 
the matter and held a “number of cases” before an election over the objection of 
one of the Justices I interviewed. 
In other Courts, the practice of delaying opinion releases is not discussed but 
sometimes occurs at the authoring Justice’s behest. And a few Justices said they 
had suspected that a colleague sat on a case to avoid releasing it before an 
election. “I’ve noted a time or two that the case is held a little bit longer than 
necessary,” commented a Justice, who echoed others. One Justice reported 
observing more blatant displays: 
I see decisions get right to the point of issuance and then pulled from the [release list] 
because an election is impending. I’ve also seen how an individual on the Court seeking 
a federal appointment handled a controversial case. The decision was ready to go, but 
all of a sudden he pulled it from the [list] to “study it.” It’s still being studied and he’s 
awaiting the outcome of the appointment. 
A few Justices reported knowing that decisions were delayed in lower courts. 
One Justice said that a trial court judge he knew continued sentencing in a death 
penalty case past an election date. After that judge was re-elected, he imposed a 
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non-death sentence, which caused a “hue and cry” among his constituents. 
Interestingly, the Justice also knew of a court of appeals judge who timed releases 
of controversial opinions for days least likely to garner press coverage. 
g.  Justices are divided on what the best methods are for their selection 
and re-selection. Reminiscent of the historical fluctuations in opinion about the 
best way to select and re-select state court judges, no consensus emerged from 
the Justices on this topic. Unsurprisingly, most Justices favored their own systems 
and pointed out flaws in other states’ methods. 
Justices in retention/re-appointment states questioned the wisdom of 
permitting voters to select judges. One Justice viewed voters as unqualified to 
make these decisions: 
Notwithstanding that Jefferson railed against the provision that provided for lifetime 
appointments, if he was alive today, he would disagree with this former stance. Electing 
judges is the worst idea. Lay people aren’t qualified to decide if judicial candidates are 
qualified. And they have no real undersetting that most laws protecting rights, most 
notably state and federal bill of rights, are designed to be counter-majoritarian. And 
that’s antithetical to the notion that it’s a good idea to elect judges. 
Justices in this group more frequently lamented the campaign fundraising 
attendant to partisan and non-partisan elections. A Justice who had formerly run 
in partisan elections as a trial court judge commented, “I know from experience 
that the people who want to give money are lawyers and corporate entities. So 
that’s the danger. You have to raise big bucks to run.” Other Justices questioned 
the independence of Justices in states with partisan and non-partisan elections. 
One recalled his experiences as a trial lawyer practicing in multiple jurisdictions: 
[M]y track record with partisan-elected judges was worse than with retention-election 
judges. I think there was a bit of “pay to play.” I walked into one courtroom in Texas 
and all the attorneys were talking about whether they were current in their 
contributions to the judge. The judge was not in the courtroom. Things did not go well 
for me. 
One Justice’s experience as a lawyer litigating a series of education-issue cases 
before another state’s Supreme Court during an election year made him a life-
long advocate of merit selection: 
We went to the [state] supreme court [multiple] times. We watched the results carefully 
and actively encouraged people to make contributions to the candidate that favored our 
position. All the decisions in our cases were [close calls] and a change of one Justice 
would have made a difference. There was absolutely no question that the election would 
decide our case. [The Justices we backed] won and we won. I have become such a 
militant about merit selection as a result. 
Retention-election states were also criticized for the potential influence of 
funded campaigns. Justices from those states that have not had challenges 
mounted against sitting colleagues nevertheless expressed concern about future 
challenges. “In [my state], we’ve been lucky by not having high-dollar campaigns 
against anyone [standing for retention],” remarked one Justice, but he worried 
how such challenges would impact his Court. “I would hope Justices would [still] 
call them like they see them.” Regardless of the possibilities of challenges, most 
TIMMER - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2019  11:02 AM 
44 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:27 
Justices in retention states don’t mount campaigns. This Justice’s laissez-faire 
attitude was typical: 
One Justice told me [in the year of my retention bid] that I should do nothing because 
there is nothing to do. [My state] is a huge state, so what am I going to productively do? 
I could spend a lot of time raising $1 million, but that won’t go far. And who is going to 
raise money to beat me? And to what end? Just to appoint someone else like me? 
Structural factors militate against a Justice making any effort in a re-election unless he 
hears of a campaign. 
Justices in retention-election states generally opined that retention elections 
strike the right balance because they permit people to have some voice in judicial 
re-selection and take political pressure off the judicial system. “Having a 
retention election, merit system, is a liberating factor,” said one Justice, “you 
don’t have to worry about how a decision impacts you personally. I would like to 
hope that Justices in partisan election states don’t worry about it, but that would 
be naïve.” Another Justice agreed, saying that “[m]erit selection for the most part 
eliminates” the concern about elections influencing decisions. He acknowledged 
that “our system, although not perfect, avoids some of the pitfalls that elected 
systems have.” 
Justices in partisan and non-partisan election states acknowledged that some 
influences exist due to elections. One Justice noted, “Does the Court change 
during an election year? Yes.” Another Justice said about the impact of elections: 
I’ve heard other judges and Justices say, “I can’t do that because an election is coming 
up” and that’s frightening to me. It’s alarming and I respond that people would respect 
the integrity behind the decision even if they disagree with the result. I also ask them 
whether, regardless, they feel they have an obligation to do what they think is right. The 
prevailing answer is “but I have to think about my own election.” I’ve heard this from 
judges and Justices in other states as well. 
This sentiment was echoed by other Justices. “One Justice [on my Court] has 
said that my constituents want me to vote for it, so that’s the second reason for 
voting for it,” related a Justice. A Justice in a partisan-election state related that 
a trial court judge recently called him upset about the “overwhelming” backlash 
he got from his supporters for holding a police officer in contempt because they 
thought it would hurt his re-election chances. “[That judge’s] circumstance is 
typical.”Another Justice in the elected-Justices group was most concerned with 
public perception: 
I think there are virtues with electing Justices. But the problem with elections is (a) 
Justices actually adjusting a decision to satisfy the electorate or contributors, and (b) a 
perception that this is what occurs. And there are concerns about where the campaign 
contributions come from. I’m more certain that the appearance problem is the real 
concern. . . . When there is a decision with political impact, the media reports the party 
affiliation of the Justices. For example, they say “three Republicans voted one way and 
four Democrats voted the other,” which perpetuates the perception that party affiliation 
drives the decision. 
But many Justices in partisan and non-partisan election states touted popular 
elections over retention and re-appointment systems. One Justice in a non-
partisan election state decried the “political litmus test” that exists when a Justice 
is appointed. He was once asked by his state governor whether the latter’s 
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vacancy-filling appointments to the appellate courts needed to be more balanced. 
The Justice candidly told the governor, “yes.” He elaborated: 
Ninety percent of appellate judges here start with an appointment. . . . In my state . . . 
one [political] party has run the table for so long. Almost all the political weight is 
behind the scenes in the appointment selection process. You just know that the 
governor will select someone who is passionate about how to decide things a particular 
way. Governors appoint “fellow travelers” and judges are in denial about how objective 
they are. . . . Some Justices on the Court wouldn’t have been appointed by a governor 
because they are independent in their decisions. But they’re on because they won an 
election. 
Others were likewise concerned with being beholden to an appointing 
authority. “The initial reaction of a new Justice is to stay close to the ideology of 
the appointing authority,” observed one Justice when discussing his Court’s mid-
term appointees. “Maybe the further the Justice gets in time from the 
appointment, he or she might go away from that. People do that. When the 
Justice gains a sense of independence from the executive branch, he or she is 
more likely to decide the case only on the law.” Two Justices drew on their own 
experience to emphasize this point. The first recounted: 
Having been through two elections and one appointment, I found the appointment 
process just as political but behind closed doors. You would never be appointed in [my 
state] if [you are a member of] a different party from the governor. The voters are more 
engaged and wanting to know about the candidate and that’s more refreshing. . . . Since 
Citizens United, there are more opportunities for outside groups to influence the 
election. Scary. But they influence the appointment process, too. The voters, like juries, 
do the right thing. 
And the second Justice concurred: 
I wouldn’t want a lifetime appointment. I don’t believe in appointments. I’ve been 
elected [multiple] times and through the appointment process [multiple] times. There 
are more politics in the appointment process. Only the governor appoints with no citizen 
nominating commission. . . . I’m not fond of the appointment process. … I also don’t 
like retention because both sides might want to vote you out. I would rather have a flesh 
and blood opponent. 
Many Justices in this group also applauded that elected Justices are more 
accountable to and in touch with the public. These comments are representative: 
I think state court judges are also people who are active and known in their respective 
districts and counties. I’m not a fan of our current U.S. Supreme Court because they’re 
out of touch. 
. . . . 
I have to raise money here, and I don’t like it, but I do the best I can to do it right. The 
good things about the electoral process is that I have to go among the people of the 
state, I have to hear about what people are concerned with—not in the sense of casting 
votes. People want judges who are honorable and run a system that keeps them safe. 
The thought that a judge can ignore sentiments, the opinions of the public, that’s not a 
good thing. It’s healthy to have honorable judges, raising money appropriately, and 
deciding cases responsibly. 
. . . . 
My observation is that some of the most politically unpopular and arguably wrong 
decisions have been made by unelected judges, primarily federal judges. Without some 
type of accountability, some of these judges feel empowered, apparently, to do what 
they want. 
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Unique in his comment, one Justice welcomed the prospect of an ineffective 
colleague being given the boot by voters: 
With elections, there’s some accountability. It might not necessarily be better. . . . 
Sometimes I saw Justices that I was glad would probably only serve one term. There are 
lots of problems with lifetime appointment. . . If perfect people were in the job with a 
lifetime appointment, it would probably be great. But that’s not going to happen. 
And at least one Justice didn’t blink about being affiliated with a political 
party. “Shouldn’t the public know about candidates? Isn’t there a benefit to 
people to know about political affiliation?” he inquired. “It’s not a hard and fast 
way to predict votes, but it’s useful information in light of the political decisions 
sometimes made,” he concluded. 
Justices from every system reported concerns about the increase of outside 
funding affecting a Justice’s re-selection bid. The combination of Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission49 and Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett50 has been “problematic,” bemoaned a Justice in a partisan-
election state. He described the first Supreme Court race in his state after those 
decisions, wherein a single outside entity raised more than $3 million to defeat 
the candidate whose hands were tied by the public financing system. “After 
Citizens United, more money poured into [my state’s] court races. Despite the 
group’s agenda, they usually pick a hot-button social issue to attack with, usually 
tarring the Justice by saying he helps criminals. Everyone who runs dreads the 
prospect of being a target.” 
Citizens United was brought up several times in the interviews and never in a 
positive light. A Justice in a sparsely populated state still favored the electoral 
process but lamented the changes wrought by Citizens United: 
The election process has changed here, as it has in other states. The outside groups, 
because of Citizens United, give independent expenditures. This is a cheap media 
market and a small state, so a little goes a long way. Advocacy groups . . . have been 
here for three cycles unsuccessfully. It has changed the election process quite a lot 
because candidates are now required to raise more money whereas before they didn’t. 
Also, now there are more contested elections. 
A Justice in a retention-election state noted a year in which “[t]here was a 
concerted effort to run off several Supreme Court Justices” by people outside the 
state. Although the effort was unsuccessful, it lowered the typical retention 
percentages. “The people behind [the campaign] disappeared.” Another Justice 
lamented the difficulty of raising money for a retention election when there is no 
opponent, making it more difficult to counter challenges. 
Despite the pitfalls of each type of selection and re-selection system, most 
Justices did not think their Courts would operate differently if Justices had life 
tenures. A Justice who later served in the federal judiciary expressed doubt 
whether the state Supreme Court would change if Justices were given life tenure: 
 
 49.  558 U.S. 310 (2010) (lifting restrictions on independent expenditures by organizations 
communicating about a candidate). 
 50.  564 U.S. 721 (2011) (striking matching funds provision of state public campaign financing act). 
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“I’ve served with federal judges who still bowed to majority view and didn’t want 
to be considered too liberal or too conservative.” 
Surprisingly, many Justices did not want life tenure. Most, like this Justice, 
preferred a system that holds a Justice accountable for his performance: 
I think in general terms, we should hold judges accountable for what they do. We want 
judges who make good decisions on the law, have the ability to write, and who conduct 
themselves with integrity. We need a system that insures that judges perform how we 
want them to while minimizing political influence. Justices need to call it like they see it 
without political factors weighing them down. We need to insulate judges without losing 
accountability. . . . There are always folks who might struggle in a particular area. If they 
are struggling, we need a process to help improvement and then hold these Justices 
accountable if they don’t improve. 
Another Justice thought the electoral process improved his judicial 
performance: 
The electoral process is an accountability tool. I wouldn’t be here if it didn’t exist. I 
disagreed with the former Chief Justice so I ran against him. My awareness of the other 
branches’ concerns and the community’s concerns is broader for running. It means you 
write a better opinion because you have these concerns in mind. The decision doesn’t 
change, though. 
Some Justices also expressed discomfort with unchecked decision-making. 
For example, one offered his opinion that, “state judges are more reasonable than 
federal judges, not as pompous. I wouldn’t want to become that.” Another 
commented that he sees “activist judges” in the federal courts because they aren’t 
accountable. “Most of us think being closer to the people is good,” remarked 
another. And another believed that lifetime appointments cause federal judges 
to lose their “filters” and “say whatever pops into their heads.” 
A few Justices thought that the culture of their Courts might change if they 
were appointed for life, like federal judges. One Justice said he and his colleagues 
might be less sensitive or less empathetic and more outspoken like some federal 
judges, thereby affecting how decisions are written but not how they are decided. 
A thoughtful Justice supposed that a life tenure would cause the Justices to 
perceive themselves as more independent. He thought that federal judges know 
this internally. “It’s more talked about in terms of a tradition, i.e., the tradition 
of the federal judiciary.” This unrestrained independence may also exist among 
Justices serving in their last terms. One such Justice reported that his colleague, 
also in his last term, commented that “we both have a free shot to do what we 
want to.” 
h.  Good character is the key characteristic for an independent Justice. 
Although I did not ask about key characteristics for high-caliber Justices, the 
topic of character continuously popped up when discussing the pressures placed 
on Justices by the re-selection process. This Justice’s comment echoed others: “It 
takes character to be a judge. He or she must ‘compartmentalize’ the outside, 
personal concerns to make decisions that they might not even like.” Another 
phrased it this way: 
If you put honorable people on the court, who understand the rule of law, they would 
more likely make decisions without considering how it might impact their chances for 
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re-election. If you put people of lesser capabilities on the bench, maybe you would get 
a different result. There is always a temptation to change a bad policy, but we don’t have 
the authority to change it. The answer to the problem is to structure the system of 
selecting judges in such a way to make sure that the best people available are the ones 
put on the bench. 
A federal judge who used to sit on a state intermediate court of appeals was 
candid in his views: 
I think there is risk that [the possibility of losing a re-selection bid] would impact 
decision making. It has a lot to do with the integrity of the judge. As a former state court 
judge, there is no way you can’t not think that your job is at issue. It risks affecting the 
substance of the opinion and definitely does affect the logic of the decision and perhaps 
its timing of release. The risks are there; it just depends on the integrity of the Justice to 
do what’s right. 
Some Justices mentioned other important characteristics for Justices. “The 
take away,” said one Justice, “is that we should always have people on the bench 
who don’t really want the job so much that they’ll compromise their views to 
retain it. The best judges are the ones who know they can make a living 
elsewhere.” Another noted that Justices who view themselves as politicians are 
more likely to vote in a way to maximize their chances of re-selection. He recalled 
sitting on an education panel with a judge from another state and thinking, “how 
can he talk like a politician?” 
A few Justices proposed taking the pressure off them by having longer terms. 
Justices with longer terms uniformly felt less anxious than Justices with shorter 
terms. “The prospect of losing is so remote, temporally,” said one, “that you don’t 
really think about it.” But even longer terms don’t fully immunize Justices from 
the anxiety of re-selection. One Justice with a long term related that a colleague 
is running in a non-partisan election in 2020 “and he is now mentioning it all the 
time, so he’s worried.” 
B. Empirical Evidence: Dissents and Special Concurrences 
My sub-hypothesis is: the re-selection processes used for sitting state Supreme 
Court Justices encourage those Justices to act strategically in dissenting and 
specially concurring to maximize their prospects of maintaining their positions. 
There has been an abundance of literature suggesting that elections may 
influence judicial decision-making, especially in criminal cases. The majority of 
Justices I interviewed vehemently denied that the prospect of losing their jobs 
influenced their decisions. But many candidly admitted that they can’t help but 
consider whether some decisions will hurt their chances for being re-selected. Do 
Justices’ personal worries subconsciously impact their decisions? 
To answer that question, which would further support or defeat my major 
hypothesis, I created the above sub-hypothesis. To test it, I examined whether 
the prospect of losing an upcoming re-selection bid impacts a Justice’s decision 
to dissent or specially concur. The primary reason for a Justice to do so is 
disagreement with the majority about its conclusion or reasoning. As Hall found, 
however, some Justices may choose not to dissent when doing so would express 
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an unpopular public view and would not affect the case outcome.51 And in my 
interviews some Justices said they sometimes preferred to write separately to 
more clearly explain decisions to the voting public. If re-selection concerns 
indeed influence Justices in deciding whether to dissent or specially concur, either 
consciously or subconsciously, different patterns should be detectable in the 
years preceding and following a re-selection event. 
1.  Methodology 
 To determine whether Justices’ behaviors in dissenting or specially 
concurring are influenced by the prospect of a re-selection event, I first identified 
the Justices who were re-selected in 2014 and served for a full year thereafter. I 
then excluded Justices appointed less than one year before an election. Sixty-five 
Justices comprise the group examined. 
I chose 2014 for a few reasons. Re-selection events that year occurred after 
the highly publicized 2010 Iowa retention election in which three Justices on the 
Iowa Supreme Court lost their seats in the wake of that Court’s controversial 
same-sex marriage opinion. That event sent shockwaves through many merit-
selection states, where Justices had believed that retention elections were only 
lost when a Justice suffered some type of personal downfall, like excessive 
drinking or gambling. Also, by 2014, Justices seeking re-selection were 
sometimes confronted with well-funded opposition campaigns by groups with 
agendas, which raised real concerns that Justices could lose their positions for 
making unpopular decisions. In short, the atmosphere present in the years 
immediately before and after the 2014 re-selection events are like those that exist 
today, making the findings more relevant. 
I performed Westlaw searches to count the number of dissents/special 
concurrences authored or joined by the Justices one year before and one year 
after their re-selection. Partial dissents and partial concurrences were counted as 
“dissents/special concurrences.” I then calculated the percentages of total cases 
decided in which the Justices dissented/specially concurred in each year and 
recorded the percentage variances.52 I separately recorded variances in 
dissent/special concurrence rates in criminal cases because “tough on crime” was 
a common campaign theme in 2014,53 and criminal cases often grabbed public 
attention, which may have tempted Justices to treat these cases differently. 
Juvenile delinquency cases based on criminal acts were included in the criminal 
case type. Finally, I assigned each Justice a number and identified their method 
of reselection: partisan election (“PE”), non-partisan election (“NPE”), 
retention election (“RE”), and re-appointment by a government entity 
(“REAPPT”) to discern the impact of re-selection methods. 
Table 1 shows the list of sixty-five Justices, their methods of re-selection, the 
percentages of cases in which they authored or joined a dissent/special 
 
 51.  Hall, supra note 45, at 1117. 
 52.  The total cases decided each year excluded cases in which the Justice was recused. 
 53.  GREYTAK, supra note 28, at 3. 
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concurrence the year before (“year 1”) and the year after (“year 2”) re-selection, 
the percentage variance between the years, and the variance rate for 
dissents/special concurrences in criminal cases (“CR”). For the Justices serving 
on Courts that do not hear criminal cases, “n/a” is noted in the column recording 
criminal case variance rates. 
Studying the information for Justice 1 aids in reading Table 1. Justice 1 was 
re-selected in a partisan election. He dissented/specially concurred in 73.91% of 
the cases he decided in the year before his election and did so in 74.28% of the 
cases in the year following the election, meaning he dissented/specially concurred 
.37% more in the year following the election. But he dissented/specially 
concurred 20.56% fewer times in criminal cases the year following the election. 
Tables 2 through 4 isolate the information in Table 1 by method of re-
selection. Those tables should be read in the same manner as Table 1. 
2.  Results and Analysis 
As with many statistical studies, the results should be read keeping in mind 
that the below-reported variance rates are not based on large numbers. Most of 
the sixty-five Justices’ dissent/special concurrence patterns studied belonged to 
Courts which decided fewer than 100 cases both the year before and the year 
after the 2014 re-selection event. And the number of dissents/special 
concurrences in a studied year ranged from zero to thirty-three. In my 
experience, these numbers are typical. These relatively low numbers make it 
difficult to put significant weight on statistical variances in dissent/special 
concurrence rates. But examining variance rates adds a sliver of light in testing 
the hypothesis. 
Assuming that a 5% variance in the percentage of dissents/special 
concurrences written or joined in the years before and after a re-selection event 
is statistically significant, three conclusions can be drawn from the information 
set forth in Table 1. 
First, although most Justices’ dissent/special concurrence patterns for all case 
types did not vary greatly in the year before and the year after re-selection events, 
about one-third of the Justices’ patterns varied by statistically significant 
percentages. Twenty-four Justices had a variance equal to or greater than 5%. 
See Figure 1.54 Interestingly, among that group, nineteen Justices 
dissented/specially concurred in a smaller percentage of cases the year after a re-
selection event. See Figure 2. This fact confirms Justices’ comments in interviews 
that they were sometimes motivated to write separately to better explain their 
decisions to the voting public or others responsible for their re-appointment. 
 
 54.  Figure 1 shows the percentage variances for all case types from the year before a re-selection 
event and the year after. Positive numbers indicate that a greater percentage of dissents/special 
concurrences were filed the year after a re-selection event and negative numbers indicate that a smaller 
percentage were filed in the year after a re-selection event. Figures 2−10 should be interpreted in the 
same manner. 
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Figure 1: Percentage variances for all case types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage variances ≥ 5%: all case types 
 
 
Second, as with the figure for all case types, most Justices’ dissent/special 
concurrence patterns in criminal cases did not vary significantly. See Figure 3. 
Only fifteen Justices had a variance equal to or greater than 5%. Eleven of those 
Justices dissented/specially concurred in a smaller percentage of cases during the 
year after the re-selection event than before. See Figure 4. This pattern further 
supports the idea that a Justice may write separately more often before a re-
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selection event than after to better explain his decisions to those having a say in 
the Justice keeping his job. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage variances for criminal cases. 
 
Figure 4: Percentage variances ≥ 5%: criminal cases. 
 
 
Third, the Justices re-selected through partisan elections had greater 
percentage variances in dissents/special concurrences than Justices re-selected by 
other methods. See Tables 2−4. Nine of the thirteen Justices re-elected in partisan 
races had variances equal to or greater than 5%. And all but one Justice wrote or 
joined a smaller percentage of dissents/special concurrences in the year after the 
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election. See Figure 5. Similarly, five of the nine Justices who decided criminal 
cases had variances equal to or greater than 5% and predominantly filed a smaller 
percentage of dissents/special concurrences in the year after the election. See 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 5: Percentage variance all case types: partisan elections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Percentage variances criminal cases: partisan elections 
 
Justices re-selected in non-partisan elections had fewer percentage variances 
than their peers running in partisan elections. Only six of the twenty-one Justices 
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in this group had variances of 5% or more. Of these six, true to the emerging 
pattern, five wrote or joined in a smaller percentage of dissents/special 
concurrences during the year after the election. See Figure 7. Examining 
dissents/special concurrences in criminal cases yielded similar results. Only four 
of the Justices had variances equal to or greater than 5% with three writing or 
joining a smaller percentage of dissents/special concurrences in the year after the 
election. See Figure 8. 
 
Figure 7: Percentage variance all case types: non-partisan elections 
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Figure 8: Percentage variances criminal cases: non-partisan elections 
 
The results for Justices re-selected in retention elections or by re-
appointments mimicked the results for Justices who ran in non-partisan elections. 
Nine of the thirty-one Justices who ran in retention elections or who were re-
appointed had percentage variance rates equal to or greater than 5%. Six of these 
nine wrote or joined in a smaller percentage of dissents/special concurrences in 
the year following re-selection. See Figure 9. Similarly, only six Justices had 
variances rates equal to or greater than 5% in criminal cases, with half writing or 
joining more dissents/special concurrences before the re-selection event and half 
after the event. See Figure 10. 
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Figure 9: Percentage variance all case types: retention elections/re-appointment. 
 
 
Figure 10: Percentage variances criminal cases: retention elections/re-
appointment. 
 
The data suggests that the sub-hypothesis is true for many Justices but not the 
majority. It also appears that Justices who ran in partisan elections were more apt 
to consider an upcoming election when deciding whether to write or join a 
dissent/special concurrence than Justices re-selected using other methods. 
Finally, the Justices who had a percentage variance of 5% or more tended to write 
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or join a smaller percentage of dissents/special concurrences the year following 
re-selection. This finding evidences what some Justices related in the interviews 
about their preferences to write separately in a case to better explain a decision 
to voters or others responsible for re-selecting the Justice. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The information gained through the interviews and the empirical data 
obtained by examining dissent/special concurrence rates in the years immediately 
preceding and following 2014 re-selection events suggest that the major 
hypothesis is true. The re-selection methods—elections and reappointments—
imposed on most state Supreme Court Justices tempt them to act strategically to 
maximize their prospects of maintaining their positions.  But while re-selection 
events may create a temptation for Justices to make decisions in a way that 
preserves their positions, it is a temptation that is generally ignored. 
Justices’ concerns about keeping their jobs are omnipresent, but most have 
come to terms with the prospect of losing their jobs and use tactics to 
compartmentalize their personal welfare concerns when making decisions. These 
Justices can prioritize the importance of the rule of law and an independent 
judiciary. Other Justices slip from time to time, particularly in the run up to a re-
selection event, and are consciously or unconsciously strategic in their decision 
making. 
Although the empirical data regarding dissents/special concurrences suggests 
that Justices who run in partisan elections are most at risk for yielding to the 
temptation to act with personal benefits in mind, all Justices subject to re-
selection are at risk. Based on my personal observations and the reflections of 
several of the interviewed Justices, it seems that the character of the Justice will 
matter most in determining whether he can resist the temptation. 
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APPENDIX  
Table 1:  Dissent/Special Concurrence rates year before/after 2014 re-selection 
event. 
 
Justices Method 
% 
year 1 
% 
year 2 
% 
Var. % CR Var 
1 PE 73.91 74.28 0.37 -20.56 
2 RE 4.79 2.5 -2.29 -0.24 
3 RE 0 3.84 3.84 0 
4 NPE 8.69 7.69 -1 4.34 
5 PE 51.85 32 
-
19.85 -26.46 
6 RE 22.91 19.14 -3.77 0.22 
7 RE 34.69 23.4 
-
11.29 -1.08 
8 RE 8.97 22 13.03 8.16 
9 RE 0 4 4 2 
10 NPE 9.6 13.86 4.26 0.53 
11 NPE 6.89 7 -0.11 3.42 
12 NPE 2.4 3.03 0.63 2.23 
13 NPE 2.38 3.79 1.52 1.26 
14 NPE 5.95 3.79 2.16 1.34 
15 PE 14.7 11.11 3.59 6.05 
16 RE 12.19 23.07 10.88 2.56 
17 RE 9.75 10.25 0.5 5.38 
18 RE 4.49 15 3.34 8.84 
19 RE 16.85 18.64 1.75 2.18 
20 NPE 16.41 2.7 13.71 7.6 
21 NPE 23.88 4.05 19.83 10.73 
22 NPE 14.92 1.35 13.57 8.95 
23 NPE 0 0 0 0 
24 REAPPT 4.68 4.54 0.14 1.56 
25 RE 15.25 24.52 9.27 3 
26 PE 18.42 13.33 5.09 1.23 
27 PE 32.43 13.33 18.97 7.33 
28 NPE 10.16 8.33 1.83 3.31 
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29 NPE 13.55 28.33 14.78 9.95 
30 RE 33.33 8 25.33 8.5 
31 RE 36 4 32 28 
32 NPE 10.71 11.34 0.63 0.69 
33 NPE 5.71 7.8 2.09 0.7 
34 RE 0 1.69 1.69 0 
35 NPE 4.98 6.72 1.74 1.18 
36 NPE 4.25 4 0.25 0 
37 REAPPT 7.81 8.45 0.64 3.12 
38 RE 1.85 1.96 0.11 0.11 
39 PE 26.31 14.28 12.03 5.76 
40 PE 13.63 13.33 0.3 4.65 
41 PE 9.09 2.22 6.87 2.22 
42 PE 27.27 22.22 5.05 2.02 
43 NPE 18.75 14.89 3.86 0.86 
44 NPE 18.55 15.62 2.93 0.16 
45 RE 44.44 25.92 18.52 0 
46 RE 10.34 10.34 0 0 
47 RE 55.17 40 15.17 0 
48 RE 66.66 10 50.66 50.66 
49 RE 5.08 2.17 2.91 0 
50 RE 11.86 10.86 1 3.61 
51 RE 4.25 0.91 3.34 2.12 
52 RE 3.44 0 3.44 3.44 
53 RE 1.06 1.9 0.84 0.11 
54 RE 2.27 3.22 0.95 0.95 
55 RE 0 1.63 1.63 0 
56 PE 5.66 3.7 1.96 n/a 
57 PE 11.53 0 11.53 n/a 
58 PE 18.96 7.4 11.56 n/a 
59 PE 11.32 5.26 6.06 n/a 
60 RE 6.66 17.46 3.32 0.16 
61 NPE 23.72 8.45 15.27 0.55 
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62 NPE 18.64 18.3 0.34 4.2 
63 NPE 22.03 16.9 5.13 0.6 
64 RE 0 1.26 1.26 0 
65 RE 1.29 0.63 0.66 0.64 
 
Table 2:  Dissent/Special Concurrence rates year before/after 2014 re-selection 
event—partisan elections. 
 
Justices Method % year 1 % year 2 % Var. 
% CR 
Var 
1 PE 73.91 74.28 0.37 -20.56 
5 PE 51.85 32 -19.85 -26.46 
15 PE 14.7 11.11 -3.59 -6.05 
26 PE 18.42 13.33 -5.09 -1.23 
27 PE 32.43 13.33 -18.97 -7.33 
39 PE 26.31 14.28 -12.03 -5.76 
40 PE 13.63 13.33 -0.3 -4.65 
41 PE 9.09 2.22 -6.87 -2.22 
42 PE 27.27 22.22 -5.05 2.02 
56 PE 5.66 3.7 -1.96 n/a 
57 PE 11.53 0 -11.53 n/a 
58 PE 18.96 7.4 -11.56 n/a 
59 PE 11.32 5.26 -6.06 n/a 
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Table 3:  Dissent/Special Concurrence rates year before/after 2014 re-selection 
event—non-partisan elections. 
 
Justices Method % year 1 % year 2 % Var. 
% CR 
Var 
4 NPE 8.69 7.69 -1 4.34 
10 NPE 9.6 13.86 4.26 0.53 
11 NPE 6.89 7 -0.11 3.42 
12 NPE 2.4 3.03 0.63 2.23 
13 NPE 2.38 3.79 1.52 1.26 
14 NPE 5.95 3.79 -2.16 1.34 
20 NPE 16.41 2.7 -13.71 -7.6 
21 NPE 23.88 4.05 -19.83 -10.73 
22 NPE 14.92 1.35 -13.57 -8.95 
23 NPE 0 0 0 0 
28 NPE 10.16 8.33 -1.83 3.31 
29 NPE 13.55 28.33 14.78 9.95 
32 NPE 10.71 11.34 0.63 0.69 
33 NPE 5.71 7.8 2.09 0.7 
35 NPE 4.98 6.72 1.74 1.18 
36 NPE 4.25 4 -0.25 0 
43 NPE 18.75 14.89 -3.86 -0.86 
44 NPE 18.55 15.62 -2.93 0.16 
61 NPE 23.72 8.45 -15.27 0.55 
62 NPE 18.64 18.3 -0.34 4.2 
63 NPE 22.03 16.9 -5.13 -0.6 
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Table 4:  Dissent/Special Concurrence rates year before/after 2014 re-selection 
event—retention elections/re-appointments. 
 
Justices Method % year 1 % year 2 % Var. 
% CR 
Var 
2 RE 4.79 2.5 -2.29 -0.24 
3 RE 0 3.84 3.84 0 
6 RE 22.91 19.14 -3.77 0.22 
7 RE 34.69 23.4 -11.29 -1.08 
8 RE 8.97 22 13.03 8.16 
9 RE 0 4 4 2 
16 RE 12.19 23.07 10.88 2.56 
17 RE 9.75 10.25 0.5 5.38 
18 RE 4.49 15 3.34 8.84 
19 RE 16.85 18.64 1.75 -2.18 
24 REAPPT 4.68 4.54 -0.14 -1.56 
25 RE 15.25 24.52 9.27 -3 
30 RE 33.33 8 -25.33 -8.5 
31 RE 36 4 -32 -28 
34 RE 0 1.69 -1.69 0 
37 REAPPT 7.81 8.45 0.64 -3.12 
38 RE 1.85 1.96 0.11 0.11 
45 RE 44.44 25.92 -18.52 0 
46 RE 10.34 10.34 0 0 
47 RE 55.17 40 -15.17 0 
48 RE 66.66 10 -50.66 -50.66 
49 RE 5.08 2.17 -2.91 0 
50 RE 11.86 10.86 -1 3.61 
51 RE 4.25 0.91 -3.34 -2.12 
52 RE 3.44 0 -3.44 -3.44 
53 RE 1.06 1.9 0.84 -0.11 
54 RE 2.27 3.22 0.95 0.95 
55 RE 0 1.63 1.63 0 
60 RE 6.66 17.46 3.32 -0.16 
64 RE 0 1.26 1.26 0 
65 RE 1.29 0.63 -0.66 -0.64 
 
